Chip windows 10.How Windows uses the Trusted Platform Module

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For more information, consult the TCG Web site. Starting with Windows 10 and Windows 11, the operating system automatically initializes and takes ownership of the TPM. There are a few exceptions, mostly related to resetting or performing a clean installation on a PC. For more information, see Clear all the keys from the TPM.

We're no longer actively developing the TPM management console beginning with Windows Server and Windows 10, version In certain specific enterprise scenarios limited to Windows 10, versions and , Group Policy might be used to back up the TPM owner authorization value in Active Directory. Because the TPM state persists across operating system installations, this TPM information is stored in a location in Active Directory that is separate from computer objects.

Certificates can be installed or created on computers that are using the TPM. The TPM can also be used as a replacement for smart cards, which reduces the costs associated with creating and disbursing smart cards. Antimalware software can use the boot measurements of the operating system start state to prove the integrity of a computer running Windows 10 or Windows 11 or Windows Server These measurements include the launch of Hyper-V to test that datacenters using virtualization are not running untrusted hypervisors.

Device health attestation enables enterprises to establish trust based on hardware and software components of a managed device. With device heath attestation, you can configure an MDM server to query a health attestation service that will allow or deny a managed device access to a secure resource. Support for TPM 1. TPM 2. Skip to main content. This browser is no longer supported.

The adoption of new authentication technology requires that identity providers and organizations deploy and use that technology. Identity providers have flexibility in how they provision credentials on client devices. For example, an organization might provision only those devices that have a TPM so that the organization knows that a TPM protects the credentials.

Endorsement key. An endorsement key certificate, signed by the manufacturer, says that the endorsement key is present in a TPM that the manufacturer made.

Attestation identity key. To protect privacy, most TPM scenarios do not directly use an actual endorsement key. Instead, they use attestation identity keys, and an identity certificate authority CA uses the endorsement key and its certificate to prove that one or more attestation identity keys actually exist in a real TPM. The identity CA issues attestation identity key certificates.

More than one identity CA will generally see the same endorsement key certificate that can uniquely identify the TPM, but any number of attestation identity key certificates can be created to limit the information shared in other scenarios.

Microsoft services can issue an attestation identity key certificate for each device, user, and identify provider to ensure that privacy is protected and to help identity providers ensure that device TPM requirements are met before Windows Hello for Business credentials are provisioned. BitLocker provides full-volume encryption to protect data at rest. The most common device configuration splits the hard drive into several volumes. The operating system and user data reside on one volume that holds confidential information, and other volumes hold public information such as boot components, system information and recovery tools.

These other volumes are used infrequently enough that they do not need to be visible to users. In the most common configuration, BitLocker encrypts the operating system volume so that if the computer or hard disk is lost or stolen when powered off, the data on the volume remains confidential.

When the computer is turned on, starts normally, and proceeds to the Windows logon prompt, the only path forward is for the user to log on with his or her credentials, allowing the operating system to enforce its normal file permissions. If something about the boot process changes, however—for example, a different operating system is booted from a USB device—the operating system volume and user data cannot be read and are not accessible.

The TPM and system firmware collaborate to record measurements of how the system started, including loaded software and configuration details such as whether boot occurred from the hard drive or a USB device.

BitLocker relies on the TPM to allow the use of a key only when startup occurs in an expected way. The system firmware and TPM are carefully designed to work together to provide the following capabilities:. Hardware root of trust for measurement. A TPM allows software to send it commands that record measurements of software or configuration information. This information can be calculated using a hash algorithm that essentially transforms a lot of data into a small, statistically unique hash value.

Successive components, whether system firmware or operating system loaders, continue the process by measuring any software components they load before running them. However, measurements are erased when the system is restarted. The result is that at each step of the system startup process, the TPM holds measurements of boot software and configuration information. Any changes in boot software or configuration yield different TPM measurements at that step and later steps.

Because the system firmware unconditionally starts the measurement chain, it provides a hardware-based root of trust for the TPM measurements. At some point in the startup process, the value of recording all loaded software and configuration information diminishes and the chain of measurements stops. The TPM allows for the creation of keys that can be used only when the platform configuration registers that hold the measurements have specific values.

Key used only when boot measurements are accurate. BitLocker creates a key in the TPM that can be used only when the boot measurements match an expected value. The expected value is calculated for the step in the startup process when Windows Boot Manager runs from the operating system volume on the system hard drive. Windows Boot Manager, which is stored unencrypted on the boot volume, needs to use the TPM key so that it can decrypt data read into memory from the operating system volume and startup can proceed using the encrypted operating system volume.

If a different operating system is booted or the configuration is changed, the measurement values in the TPM will be different, the TPM will not let Windows Boot Manager use the key, and the startup process cannot proceed normally because the data on the operating system cannot be decrypted. If someone tries to boot the system with a different operating system or a different device, the software or configuration measurements in the TPM will be wrong and the TPM will not allow use of the key needed to decrypt the operating system volume.

As a failsafe, if measurement values change unexpectedly, the user can always use the BitLocker recovery key to access volume data. Device hardware characteristics are important to BitLocker and its ability to protect data. One consideration is whether the device provides attack vectors when the system is at the logon screen.

To mitigate this risk, organizations can configure BitLocker so that the TPM key requires both the correct software measurements and an authorization value. The system startup process stops at Windows Boot Manager, and the user is prompted to enter the authorization value for the TPM key or insert a USB device with the value.

This process stops BitLocker from automatically loading the key into memory where it might be vulnerable, but has a less desirable user experience. Newer hardware and Windows work better together to disable direct memory access through ports and reduce attack vectors.

The result is that organizations can deploy more systems without requiring users to enter additional authorization information during the startup process. Device Encryption is the consumer version of BitLocker, and it uses the same underlying technology.

How it works is if a customer logs on with a Microsoft account and the system meets Modern Standby hardware requirements, BitLocker Drive Encryption is enabled automatically in Windows. The recovery key is backed up in the Microsoft cloud and is accessible to the consumer through his or her Microsoft account.

In addition, Modern Standby hardware is designed to reduce the likelihood that measurement values change and prompt the customer for the recovery key. For software measurements, Device Encryption relies on measurements of the authority providing software components based on code signing from manufacturers such as OEMs or Microsoft instead of the precise hashes of the software components themselves.

This permits servicing of components without changing the resulting measurement values. For configuration measurements, the values used are based on the boot security policy instead of the numerous other configuration settings recorded during startup. These values also change less frequently. The result is that Device Encryption is enabled on appropriate hardware in a user-friendly way while also protecting data. Windows 8 introduced Measured Boot as a way for the operating system to record the chain of measurements of software components and configuration information in the TPM through the initialization of the Windows operating system.

In previous Windows versions, the measurement chain stopped at the Windows Boot Manager component itself, and the measurements in the TPM were not helpful for understanding the starting state of Windows.

The Windows boot process happens in stages and often involves third-party drivers to communicate with vendor-specific hardware or implement antimalware solutions. For configuration settings, Measured Boot records security-relevant information such as signature data that antimalware drivers use and configuration data about Windows security features e.

Measured Boot ensures that TPM measurements fully reflect the starting state of Windows software and configuration settings. If security settings and other protections are set up correctly, they can be trusted to maintain the security of the running operating system thereafter.

TPM measurements are designed to avoid recording any privacy-sensitive information as a measurement. As an additional privacy protection, Measured Boot stops the measurement chain at the initial starting state of Windows. Therefore, the set of measurements does not include details about which applications are in use or how Windows is being used.

Measurement information can be shared with external entities to show that the device is enforcing adequate security policies and did not start with malware. When new security features are added to Windows, Measured Boot adds security-relevant configuration information to the measurements recorded in the TPM. Measured Boot enables remote attestation scenarios that reflect the system firmware and the Windows initialization state.

Figure 2: Process used to create evidence of boot software and configuration using a TPM. Some Windows improvements help security solutions implement remote attestation scenarios. Microsoft provides a Health Attestation service, which can create attestation identity key certificates for TPMs from different manufacturers as well as parse measured boot information to extract simple security assertions, such as whether BitLocker is on or off.

The simple security assertions can be used to evaluate device health. Mobile device management MDM solutions can receive simple security assertions from the Microsoft Health Attestation service for a client without having to deal with the complexity of the quote or the detailed TPM measurements.

MDM solutions can act on the security information by quarantining unhealthy devices or blocking access to cloud services such as Microsoft Office The user employed the token to access resources that he or she was permitted to use. The attacker could then use harvested tokens to log on to other machines and collect more credentials.

Similar to the way Microsoft Hyper-V keeps virtual machines VMs separate from one another, Credential Guard uses virtualization to isolate the process that hashes credentials in a memory area that the operating system kernel cannot access. This isolated memory area is initialized and protected during the boot process so that components in the larger operating system environment cannot tamper with it. Credential Guard uses the TPM to protect its keys with TPM measurements, so they are accessible only during the boot process step when the separate region is initialized; they are not available for the normal operating system kernel.

Download 3DP Chip for Windows 10, 7, 8/ (64 bit/32 bit) - TPM Overview

Upgrade to Microsoft Edge to take advantage of the latest features, security updates, and technical support. Trusted Platform Module TPM technology is designed to provide hardware-based, security-related functions.

A TPM chip is a secure crypto-processor that is designed to carry out cryptographic operations. The chip includes multiple physical security mechanisms to make it tamper-resistant, and malicious software is unable to tamper with the security functions of the TPM.

Some of the key advantages of using TPM technology are that you can:. The most common TPM functions are used for system integrity measurements and for key creation and use.

During the boot process of a system, the boot code that is loaded including firmware and the operating system components can be measured and recorded in the TPM. The integrity measurements can be used as evidence for how a system started and to make sure that a TPM-based key was used only when the correct software was used to boot the system.

TPM-based keys can be configured in a variety of ways. This is good to mitigate phishing attacks because it prevents the key from being copied and used without the TPM. TPM-based keys can also be configured to require an authorization value to use them. If too many incorrect authorization guesses occur, the TPM will activate its dictionary attack logic and prevent further authorization value guesses. For more information, consult the TCG Web site.

Starting with Windows 10 and Windows 11, the operating system automatically initializes and takes ownership of the TPM. There are a few exceptions, mostly related to resetting or performing a clean installation on a PC. For more information, see Clear all the keys from the TPM. We're no longer actively developing the TPM management console beginning with Windows Server and Windows 10, version In certain specific enterprise scenarios limited to Windows 10, versions and , Group Policy might be used to back up the TPM owner authorization value in Active Directory.

Because the TPM state persists across operating system installations, this TPM information is stored in a location in Active Directory that is separate from computer objects. Certificates can be installed or created on computers that are using the TPM. The TPM can also be used as a replacement for smart cards, which reduces the costs associated with creating and disbursing smart cards. Antimalware software can use the boot measurements of the operating system start state to prove the integrity of a computer running Windows 10 or Windows 11 or Windows Server These measurements include the launch of Hyper-V to test that datacenters using virtualization are not running untrusted hypervisors.

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